Labour taxation and its impact on employment growth by Dolenc, Primož & Laporšek, Suzana
Labour Taxation and Its Impact
on Employment Growth
Primož Dolenc
Suzana Laporšek
The paper aims to assess the characteristics of labour taxation for five
diﬀerent groups of workers and labour market performance (in terms
of employment and unemployment rate) in the eu and to examine
whether tax wedge aﬀects employment growth in the eu. The descrip-
tive empirical estimates show that the level of labour taxation varies
greatly across eu Member States, by which the tax wedge tends to be
higher among NewMember States (excluding Cyprus and Malta). Fur-
thermore, the panel regression analyses confirm statistically significant
negative relationship between tax wedge and employment growth in
the eu as a whole. Therefore, the empirical analysis suggests that the
eu-27 should continue with the trend of reducing tax wedge, as this
would have favourable eﬀects on labourmarket performance, especially
among New Member States.
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Introduction
The impact of labour taxation on labour market outcomes has been a
subject of numerous discussions in recent years. Namely, by creating a
wedge between total labour costs to the employer and the corresponding
net take-home pay of the employee, labour taxes in not perfectly flexi-
ble labour markets reduce demand for labour (if demand for labour is
not perfectly inelastic) and employment and, therefore, increase unem-
ployment (Vodopivec 2004) and intensify exit from the labour force. The
existing literature suggests that labour taxation negatively aﬀects labour
market performance, yet the extent of its negative impact appears to be
aﬀected by the institutional features of the individual labourmarkets (for
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an overview of studies see, for example, Nickell (2003), de Haan, Sturm
and, Volkerink (2003) and oecd (2006)).
In recent years, most of the oecd countries and the eu Member States
started to reduce tax wedge on labour in order to alleviate unemploy-
ment problems, stimulate job creation, and improve general economic
framework (oecd 2006; European Commission 2005). Therefore, the
main objective of this paper is to assess the characteristics of labour tax-
ation and labour market outcomes (in terms of employment and un-
employment rate) in the eu Member States, to examine diﬀerences in
labour taxation between eu-15 andNewMember States (nms) and, most
importantly, to analyse whether tax wedge aﬀects employment growth in
the eu.
In order to explain the characteristics of taxes levied on labour and in-
dicators of labour market performance, we apply basic descriptive statis-
tics. Further, we use cross plots and bivariate correlation analysis to ex-
amine the relationship between employment growth and labour taxa-
tion. To study the impact of tax wedge on employment growth in detail,
we employ panel regression analysis on the sample of 27 eu Member
States over the period 1999–2009, by which we expect a negative associ-
ation. As the analysis of labour tax wedge would be performed for five
diﬀerent groups of workers and would include the latest available data
(for the period 1999–2010), the study presents an important value-added
in the field.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section gives
a brief overview of previous empirical studies on the impact of tax wedge
on labour market outcomes, followed by the presentation of data and
methodology in the third section. The fourth section presents the de-
scriptive statistics and dynamics of labour taxation and the results on the
impact of tax wedge on employment growth in the eu. The fifth section
concludes and gives relevant policy recommendations.
Literature Review
Tax wedge denotes the gap between the cost of labour and the purchasing
power of wages (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004, 753). In a classical compet-
itive labour market approach, the increase of tax wedge can be presented
by a downward shift in the labour demand curve. The more elastic is the
labour supply curve (and/or demand curve), the higher is the negative ef-
fect of tax wedge on employment (Carey 2003, 39–40). Several theoretical
and empirical studies try to explain the relationship between labour tax-
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ation and labour market outcomes, taking into consideration diﬀerent
institutional features of the individual labour markets (i. e. regulations
concerning employment protection, unemployment benefits, minimum
wages, skill levels, rigidity of wages and structure of wage bargaining and
other labour market policies and institutions). In the continuation of
this section, we briefly present some of the most influential empirical
studies performed on the macro-level.¹ An overview of these studies is
available in de Haan, Sturm and Volkerink (2003), Nickell (2003) and
oecd (2006).
In one of the most cited studies, Nickell and Layard (1999) studied
the panel of 20 oecd countries between 1983–1994 and showed that a
decrease in average tax wedge (including payroll, income and consump-
tion taxes) for 5 percentage points would reduce the unemployment rate
by 13%. Likewise in one of the following studies, Nickell (2003) reported
that an increase in tax wedge by 10 percentage point would result in the
reduction of labour input of the working age population by somewhere
between 1 and 3%. Similarly, based on the panel of 21 oecd countries
during 1983 and 2003, Bassanini and Duval (2006) confirmed that high
tax wedge and generous unemployment benefits increase aggregate un-
employment and lower employment prospect. Their obtained empirical
results have shown that a 10 percentage points reduction of the tax wedge
in an average oecd country would reduce equilibrium unemployment
by 2.8 percentage points and increase the employment rate by a larger
3.7 percentage points (due to the positive impact on participation). The
detrimental eﬀect of labour taxation on unemployment in oecd coun-
tries was confirmed also by Belot and van Ours (2004). Using the panel
of 18 oecd countries during the 1960–1994 period authors found that
a 10 percentage point higher tax rate is related to a 1.2 percentage point
higher unemployment rate.
Several important analyses on the impact of labour taxation on labour
market performance have also been performed in the eu countries. For
example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argued that the slowdown in the
economic growth and an increase in unemployment in European coun-
tries over the 1965–1991 period were associated with higher labour taxes
in combination with institutional characteristics of the labour market.
Namely, the correlation was stronger in highly unionized countries of
the Continental Europe and much less so in the Scandinavian countries
with highly centralized trade unions. The importance of the collective
bargaining arrangement was also confirmed by the study of the Euro-
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pean Commission (2004), which found that the negative eﬀect of tax
wedge on employment is higher in the eu countries with intermediate
levels of bargaining co-ordination.²
With the enlargement of the eu, a number of authors start to focus
their research on the impact of labour taxation on the labourmarket per-
formance of the nms. Góra et al. (2006) confirmed a negative eﬀect of tax
wedge on employment growth in eight nms and provided evidence that
tax wedge more strongly aﬀects employment rates among low-skilled
workers, but high-skilled are rather immune from this eﬀect. Kosi and
Bojnec (2006) examined the eﬀect of tax wedge on employment growth
in the eu-25 over the period from 1997 to 2004. They established that
the impact of labour taxation on employment growth tends to be signif-
icantly larger in the eight eu transition countries (nms) than in the eu
non-transition countries. In similar vein, Cazes (2002) found that pay-
roll taxes in transition countries are positively correlated with unemploy-
ment rates, especially with long-term and youth unemployment rates.
Furthermore, Võrk et al. (2007) showed, using panel regression analysis
of eight nms between 1996 and 2004, that higher tax wedge has a sig-
nificant negative impact on labour force participation and employment
rate (especially for elderly). The results showed that reduction of the tax
wedge by 1 percentage point increases employment rate by about 0.2–0.7
percentage points. A detrimental eﬀect of high tax wedges and/or inap-
propriate benefits systems on the generation of desirable labour market
outcomes (employment, unemployment and inactivity) was confirmed
also on the sample of ten Central and Eastern eu Member States (cee)³
by Behar (2009). A brief review of the literature suggests that tax wedge
has been one of the significant reasons for unfavourable labour market
performance among countries. Nevertheless, even the estimates of the
negative impact of tax wedge on labour market outcomes may be rel-
atively strong, they are subjected to criticism due to robustness of data
and empirical model (Blanchard 2006).
Methodology and Data
The analysis of labour taxation is based on the average tax wedge indi-
cator calculated according to the oecd methodology (see oecd 2008).
The tax wedge is expressed as the ratio of total labour taxes to total labour
costs as paid by an employer:
ATW =
PIT + SSCe + SSCf + PT − CB
w + PIT + SSCe + SSCf + PT
, (1)
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where ATW stands for average tax wedge, PIT is personal income tax,
SSCe social security contributions paid by employees, SSCf social secu-
rity contributions paid by firms/employer, PT payroll tax paid by em-
ployers, CB cash benefits and w net wage. In the analysis we observe tax
wedge for five diﬀerent groups of workers, i. e. single worker without
children at three diﬀerent wage levels (67%, 100% and 167% of average
wage), single worker with two children receiving 67% of average earn-
ings and two-earners family (one receiving 67% and the other 100% of
average earnings) with two children. Workers are employed in industry
sectors c–k.⁴
The methodological scope of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we examine
the level of labour taxation for all of the above mentioned family types,
employment rate, and unemployment rate in the eu Member States by
using descriptive statistics.Moreover, we present diﬀerences between eu-
15 and nms (statistical significance of diﬀerences is tested by the Mann-
Whitney U test).⁵ The analysis is performed on the latest available data
for 2009 and 2010.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we firstly examinewhether
tax wedge can explain variations in employment growth among the eu
countries by applying two-variable cross-country scatter diagrams and
bivariate correlation analysis. We continue our empirical analysis with
an in-depth study of the impact of tax wedge on employment growth.
Following the macroeconomic empirical studies on this issue (see for
example Nickell and Layard 1999; Daveri and Tabellini 2000; Belot and
van Ours 2004; Võrk et al. 2007; Žižmond and Novak 2006), we employ
a panel regression analysis, performed on the sample of 27 eu Member
States over the 1999–2009 period. The panel regression analysis includes
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to control for heteroskedacity, autocorre-
lation and cross-sectional dependence.⁶We formed a regression function
(2) with the following specifications:
EGi,t = α+β1·lnTWi,t+β2·Di,t+β3·DTWi,t+Π·
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
lnGDPpci,t
lnIRi,t
lnLPi,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+εi,t ,(2)
where EG denotes employment growth in country i at time t, TW stands
for tax wedge, GDPpc for gross domestic product (gdp) per capita, IR
for inflation rate and LP for labour productivity. Parameter ε stands for
stochastic disturbances. Moreover, we also introduce dummy variable D
in the interactive and multiplicative form DTW (D multiplied by TW)
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in order to control for diﬀerences between eu-15 (dummy variable takes
the value 0) and nms (dummy variable takes the value 1). We perform
five separate regression analyses, i. e. for each of the studied family types
and wage levels (see above).
Data on employment growth were collected on the basis of Labour
Force Surveys and present the change in percentage from one year to
another of the total number of employed persons in the country (see
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). The main explanatory variable is tax
wedge, other explanatory variables represent control variables. There-
fore, as a measure of control for macroeconomic eﬀects that may influ-
ence labour market developments, we include gdp per capita (expressed
in Purchasing Power Standards – pps) and inflation rate (in order to take
into consideration eﬀects in monetary or fiscal policy). Labour produc-
tivity is measured as gdp in pps per hour worked.
The panel data on labour taxation were obtained from oecd and Eu-
rostat databases (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx; http://epp.eurostat.ec
.europa.eu). Data for control explanatory variables (except for labour
productivity) were obtained from Eurostat and oﬃcial reports of the
European Commission (2009a; 2009b; 2010). The data on labour pro-
ductivity were obtained from The Conference Board statistical database
(http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase).
Although the period we analyse is determined by the availability of the
data, going further back in the past would not bring clear results in most
of the nms, as their economies were under great influence of the transi-
tional economic and political processes (see Vodopivec, Wörgötter, and
Raju 2005; Võrk et al. 2007; Jerman, Kavcˇicˇ, and Kavcˇicˇ 2010). Moreover,
the analysis focuses on the size of the tax wedge-employment growth re-
lationship on the labour demand side, while it does not study in detail
the eﬀects of factors at the labour supply side and other labour market
institutions (for example minimumwage, skills, employment protection
legislation, etc.).
Empirical Analysis
overview of labour taxation and labour market
performance in the european union
There are large diﬀerences in the level of labour taxation among eu
Member States. As can be seen from table 1, which gives an overview of
the latest available data on tax wedge for three family types at three dif-
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table 1 Tax wedge according to the family type and level of average earnings,
employment rate and unemployment rate (in %) in the eu, 2010
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Austria 43.3 47.9 50.4 26.4 40.0 71.7 4.5
Belgium 49.5 55.4 60.6 34.8 47.8 62.0 8.4
Bulgariaa 33.9 33.8 33.8 19.4 28.0 59.7 10.3
Cyprusa : : : : : 69.7 6.4
Czech Republic 38.9 42.2 44.7 15.7 34.4 65.0 7.4
Denmark 36.7 38.3 44.5 11.0 33.7 73.4 7.6
Estonia 38.6 40.0 41.2 23.4 35.5 61.0 17.3
Finland 36.3 42.0 47.9 24.7 36.5 68.1 8.5
France 45.5 49.3 53.2 37.2 44.3 64.0 9.3
Germany 44.9 49.1 51.5 29.7 41.4 71.1 7.2
Greece 34.4 36.6 41.9 34.4 35.7 59.6 12.7
Hungary 43.6 46.4 52.7 26.6 39.2 55.4 11.2
Ireland 23.4 29.3 39.9 –9.5 21.1 60.0 13.7
Continued on the next page
ferent levels of average earnings, Belgium, France and Germany exhibit
the highest level of labour taxation, whereas Ireland and Malta stand out
with the lowest tax wedge.
All eu Member States, with exception of Bulgaria, record a progres-
sive tax wedge (commonly due to progressive income tax rates), imply-
ing that the level of labour taxation increases with an increase of wage
levels. Namely, average value of labour taxation in the eu-27 in 2009⁷
amounted 37.0% for single worker with 67%of average earnings, whereas
43.8% for worker with 167% of average earnings. As can be seen from ta-
ble 2, the progressivity of tax wedge is more intense among old Member
States.Moreover, labour is less taxed for families (for a single worker with
two children and 67% of average earnings on average amounted 20.5%,
whereas for two-earner family 34.8%), mostly due to their entitlement to
cash benefits.
Labour taxation in the eu is relatively high in international compar-
ative framework, especially when compared to oecd countries that are
notmembers of the eu. For example, average tax wedge for single worker
with 67% and 167% average earnings amounted 24.0% and 31.8%, re-
spectively, what for even 13.0 and 11.2 percentage points, respectively, ex-
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table 1 Continued from the previous page
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Italy 43.6 46.9 52.1 27.2 42.1 56.9 8.5
Latviaa 41.5 42.2 42.7 28.2 35.0 59.3 19.0
Lithuaniaa 38.9 40.7 42.1 8.0 36.6 57.8 18.0
Luxembourg 27.5 34.0 41.4 0.4 20.9 65.2 4.4
Maltaa 17.7 22.3 26.4 1.1 18.8 56.0 7.0
The Netherlands 34.0 39.2 42.5 14.4 33.7 74.7 4.5
Poland 33.4 34.3 35.0 28.4 30.8 59.3 9.7
Portugal 32.8 37.7 43.8 21.6 33.1 65.6 11.4
Romaniaa 43.1 44.4 45.5 30.7 41.0 58.8 7.6
Slovakia 34.5 37.8 40.2 21.4 31.2 58.8 14.4
Slovenia 38.5 42.4 47.3 11.8 33.8 66.2 7.4
Spain 36.4 39.6 42.5 28.8 36.6 58.6 20.2
Sweden 40.6 42.7 50.8 32.2 38.5 72.7 8.6
United Kingdom 29.6 32.7 37.5 10.7 28.8 69.5 7.9
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) single person, 0 children, 67% of aver-
age earnings, (2) single person, 0 children, 100% of average earnings, (3) single per-
son, 0 children, 167% of average earnings, (4) single person, 2 children, 67% of av-
erage earnings, (5) 2-earner family, 2 children, 67% and 100% of average earnings,
(6) employment rate (15–64 years), (7) unemployment rate (15–64 years). a Data refer
to the year 2009. Adapted from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) and oecd
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx).
ceeds the average of the eu-27 (diﬀerences are statistically significant at
5% level of significance). These high diﬀerences among others reflect less
strict employment regulation among non-eu oecd countries.
Comparing old and new eu member countries, labour taxation is on
average lower in nms for all family types and at all levels of average earn-
ings. However, the diﬀerence is not statistically significant at 5% level
of significance, probably due to high variability in tax wedges in nms
(see table 2). As the low averages in nms could be reasoned with the
level of tax wedge in Cyprus and Malta,⁸ two facts should be taken into
consideration in further analysis. Firstly, a more appropriate measure of
comparison between eu-15 and nms is median tax wedge (see table 2)
and, secondly, Cyprus andMalta should be studied separately from other
(Central and Eastern) nms, which share similar characteristics also due
to the transitional development in the 1990s. This is in line with studies
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table 2 Descriptive statistics on labour taxation, employment and unemployment
rate by groups of countries, 2009
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
eu-27a
Mean 37.0 40.5 44.7 20.5 34.8 64.5 9.0
St. deviation 7.4 7.5 7.6 11.8 7.5 5.9 3.6
Median 37.9 40.1 43.8 23.8 34.9 63.5 8.0
eu-15b
Mean 37.2 41.5 47.1 21.1 35.7 66.9 8.4
St. deviation 7.6 7.4 6.4 13.5 8.0 5.9 3.4
Median 36.9 39.5 48.2 25.4 37.0 66.3 8.0
nmsa,b
Mean 36.8 39.2 41.4 19.7 33.5 61.5 9.6
St. deviation 7.5 7.7 8.2 9.7 6.8 4.5 3.9
Median 38.7 40.7 42.1 21.2 34.2 60.6 7.8
ceeb
Mean 38.7 40.9 43.0 21.6 35.0 61.4 10.3
St. deviation 4.2 5.5 6.9 7.9 5.0 3.5 3.9
Median 38.8 41.4 42.4 21.9 34.5 60.6 9.2
Estimates of the Mann-Whitney U test
eu-15 vs. nms 80.0 72.5 47.0** 68.5 61.5 42.5* 81.0
eu-15 vs. cee 65.0 72.5 47.0 66.5 61.5 33.0* 58.0
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) single person, 0 children, 67% of aver-
age earnings, (2) single person, 0 children, 100% of average earnings, (3) single person, 0
children, 167%of average earnings, (4) single person, 2 children, 67%of average earnings,
(5) 2-earner family, 2 children, 67% and 100% of average earnings, (6) employment rate
(15–64 years), (7) unemployment rate (15–64 years). a Cyprus is due to the lack of data ex-
cluded from the calculations of descriptive statistics for labour taxation. b eu-15 refers to
the eu Member States that become members of the eu prior to 2004. nms (12) refers to
all eu Member States that joined eu after 2004. cee-10 includes 10 Central and Eastern
eu Member States that joined eu after 2004 (i. e. nms without Cyprus and Malta). Sig-
nificance level: * 5%, ** 10%. Adapted from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
and oecd (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx).
performed by Ederveen and Thissen (2007), Võrk et al. (2006) and Behar
(2009).
Taking into the account the above obtained conclusions, the descrip-
tive statistical analysis shows that with the regard to the median measure
cee countries in 2009 record higher tax wedge for single workers with
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figure 1 Comparison of labour taxation in eu-15 and cee-10, 2009
notes (i) and (ii) refer to single worker without children with 67% and 167% of av-
erage earnings, respectively, (iii) refers to single low-paid worker with two children and
(iv) refers to two-earner family (one earning 100% and the other 67% of average earn-
ings) with two children. The horizontal line inside the shaded box is the median value
of the group; the bottom edge of the shaded box presents 25th percentile and the up-
per edge 75th percentile; the horizontal lines outside the box indicate the largest and the
smallest value in the sample; the dot indicates the largest value in the sample of cee-10
(56.7 per cent). Similar analysis on tax wedge for year 2005 was performed also by Be-
har (2009). Based on data from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) and oecd
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx).
table 3 Dynamics of labour taxation in eu-15 and cee, 1999–2010, median
Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
eu-27 37.9 38.9 38.4 38.3 37.9 37.9 37.3 37.2 37.1 36.5
High tax wedge group 38.7 40.3 39.9 39.5 38.4 38.3 37.9 38.0 38.2 38.0
Low tax wedge group 37.1 37.6 37.0 37.1 37.4 37.6 36.8 36.4 36.1 35.0
Median eu-27 41.1 41.4 41.3 40.9 40.9 40.8 41.4 40.1 40.6 38.9
67% and 100% of average earnings, whereas the labour taxation is lower
for high-paid single workers (even for 5.8 percentage points) and for both
family types with children (see table 2). Diﬀerences between groups of
countries are not statistically significant at 5% level of significance. Nev-
ertheless, as it can be seen from figure 1, the height of the boxes and the
distances between minimum and maximum values of tax wedge indicate
higher labour taxation heterogeneity within eu-15.
Table 3 presents the dynamics of labour taxation at three diﬀerent wage
levels in eu-15 and cee countries over the 1999–2010 period. The median
labour taxation was, in general, slowly declining after the 2000 in both
groups, by which the decline was the most pronounced in the last two
years (except for high paid workers). The dynamics was more intense
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in labour taxation of single average worker in eu-15, as the median tax
wedge value increased for 3 percentage points in 2006 comparing to the
year before and then again decreased in 2009 for 4 percentage points
comparing to the year before (the dynamics mostly reflects changes in
labour taxation in the Netherlands and Greece). Comparing eu-15 and
cee, the median labour taxation is higher in cee countries for low-paid
worker, whereas for high-paid workers the tax wedge is lower (yet, diﬀer-
ences in labour taxation were not statistically significant over the studied
period). On average, the decrease in labour taxation was greater among
cee countries at all family types and at all levels of earnings. Namely,
over the 1999–2009 period the tax wedge for single worker at diﬀerent
wage levels varied between 3.1 and 3.7 percentage points in cee, whereas
in eu-15 from 0.4 to 1.3 percentage points.
Regarding the employment rate, the eu-15 countries recorded statis-
tically significant (at 5% level of significance) higher tax wedge over the
1999–2010 period. The employment rate was steadily increasing in both
groups of countries until 2008, followed by the decrease of employment
in the last two years, reflecting the economic situation influenced by cri-
sis. Therefore, themedian employment rate decreased to 65.6% in 2010 in
eu-15 and to 59.3% in cee. On the other hand, the unemployment rate
increased: the median unemployment rate in eu-15 in 2010 amounted
8.5%, while in cee 10.8%, yet the diﬀerence is not statistically significant
(see table 2).
As the dynamics of labour taxation and employment rate is quite sim-
ilar, we examined whether there was any correlation between labour tax-
ation and employment and unemployment rate over the 1999–2008 pe-
riod. We find no evidence on the association between tax wedge and
employment rate, as the bivariate correlation coeﬃcients were statisti-
cally insignificant at 5% level of significance for all studied groups of
workers. The correlation coeﬃcients were statistically insignificant at 5%
level of significance also between tax wedge and unemployment rate for
single workers with 67%, 100% or 167% workers. However, the results
show the existence of a weak positive association between labour taxa-
tion and unemployment rate for single low-paid worker with two chil-
dren (the correlation coeﬃcient amounted 0.257 at 5% level of signifi-
cance) and for two-earner family (the correlation coeﬃcient amounted
0.129 at 5% level of significance).⁹ Therefore, a further analysis on the
relationship between labour taxation and labour market performance is
needed.
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figure 2 Relation between tax wedge and employment growth in eu-15 and cee
notes * with 67% of average wage; data refer to the period 1999–2009. Based on data
from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) and oecd (http://stats.oecd.org/index
.aspx).
relationship between labour taxation and
employment growth
In this section, we focus on the relationship between tax wedge and em-
ployment growth. To study the association, we firstly use simple two-
variable cross-country scatter diagrams to plot employment growth and
tax wedge. As can be seen from figure 2, there is a weak negative corre-
lation between tax wedge for low-paid workers and employment growth
among eu and cee Member States in the 1999–2009 period. The pres-
ence of the negative correlation between employment growth and labour
taxation was observed also in scatter plots of all other studied family
types. The existence of negative correlation was confirmed also by bi-
variate correlation analysis (see table 4). For example, the correlation
coeﬃcient between tax wedge for low-paid workers and employment
growth in the eu-27 amounted –0.230 (statistically significant at 5% level
of significance). However, the size of the negative correlation coeﬃcient
estimate between labour taxation for single workers and employment
growth is decreasing with the rise of wages. The correlation coeﬃcients
in table 4 also show that correlation between labour taxation is higher
(and statistically significant at 5% level of significance) among old eu
countries. A significant negative correlation was observed for workers
with children.
In order to examine the tax wedge-employment growth relation in
more detail, we conducted panel data regression analysis for all eu Mem-
ber States over the period from 1999 to 2009. As can be seen from table 5,
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table 4 Correlation coeﬃcient estimates between employment growth and labour
taxation
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eu-27 –0.230* –0.195* –0.140* –0.174* –0.236*
eu-15 –0.220* –0.172* –0.154* –0.204* –0.245*
cee –0.123 –0.095 –0.067 –0.051 –0.135
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) single person, 0 children, 67% of average
earnings, (2) single person, 0 children, 100% of average earnings, (3) single person, 0
children, 167%of average earnings, (4) single person, 2 children, 67%of average earnings,
(5) 2-earner family, 2 children, 67% and 100% of average earnings. Signif. level: *5%.
table 5 Estimates of the panel regression analysis for the eu-27, 1999–2009
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnTW –1.746* –1.878* –2.455* –0.057 –1.644*
lnGDPpc –0.041 –0.070 –0.114 –0.197* –0.018
lnIR 0.611 0.624 0.646 0.577 0.583
lnLP 1.885* 1.926* 2.037* 2.165* 1.670*
D –0.036 0.021 –0.192 –0.061 0.475
DTW –0.003 –0.007 –0.005 –0.001 –0.022
Constant 0.520 1.376 4.011 –4.727 0.619
R2 0.211 0.206 0.206 0.156 0.211
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) single person, 0 children, 67% of average
earnings, (2) single person, 0 children, 100% of average earnings, (3) single person, 0
children, 167%of average earnings, (4) single person, 2 children, 67%of average earnings,
(5) 2-earner family, 2 children, 67% and 100% of average earnings. Signif. level: *5%.
the regression estimates confirm statistically significant negative impact
of tax wedge on employment growth in all studied family types with the
exception of low-paid workers with two children. The size of the neg-
ative impact of labour taxation on employment growth diﬀers between
workers according to their level of average earnings, confirming that the
elasticities between tax wedge and employment growth are increasing
with wage. Namely, an increase in tax wedge for low-paid worker for one
percentage point reduces employment growth for 1.7%, ceteris paribus,
whereas for high-paid workers decrease is higher and amounts 2.5%, ce-
teris paribus. We find no evidence on the diﬀerence in the negative im-
pact of labour taxation on employment growth between eu-15 and nms
(the regression estimates for DTW are statistically significant). There-
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fore, the results imply that lowering labour taxation would improve the
employment growth among eu countries.
Although the panel regression coeﬃcients on tax wedge are low and
suﬀer from low R2 values, findings are, in general, in line with various
empirical studies, which also confirmed negative relation between tax
wedge and labour market outcomes. For example, Ederveen and Thissen
(2007) found a statistically significant positive relationship between un-
employment rate and tax wedge on the sample of four cee countries.
Also Góra et al. (2006) showed a strong and significant negative relation-
ship between employment growth and tax wedge in cee and a strong im-
pact of tax wedge employment rates of low-skilled workers. Behar (2009)
as well concluded that high tax wedge and inappropriate benefit system
are associated with poor labour market outcomes, but the evidence was
weak.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations
This paper assessed the characteristics of labour taxation and labour
market performance in the eu Member States based on the latest avail-
able data and examined whether tax wedge aﬀected the employment
growth in the eu Member States over the period from 1999 to 2009.
The findings of the paper imply that the reduction in taxes on labour
could increase demand on labour and employment as it would moti-
vate the employers to create jobs,¹⁰ especially for low-wage workers, and
increase people’s willingness to work (oecd 2009). The establishment
of the employment-friendly wage is also crucial for increasing produc-
tivity and improving general economic framework in the eu (European
Commission 2005). Several Member States have already taken measures
to reduce tax wedge such as reducing social security contributions for
disadvantaged groups, lowering tax threshold for personal income tax,
tightening the provision of contributions for self-employment, changing
the legislation in the field of minimum wages and social security con-
tributions, increase in nominal wages, etc. (more information on mea-
sures across the eu Member States are available in quarterly reports of
the European Employment Observatory (http://www.eu-employment-
observatory.net) and in Carone et al. (2009)).
Policy recommendation following from our empirical analysis is clear:
the eu should continue with the trend of reducing labour taxation, as
this would have favourable eﬀects on employment growth and would
consequently lead to higher productivity and improve competitiveness.
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However, the reduction in tax wedge is not a suﬃcient measure to in-
crease employment, as the reasons for high unemployment rate in many
eu Member States are very diverse and complex, including high unem-
ployment benefits, wage negation system and powerful labour unions,
employment protection legislation, diﬀerences in distribution of wages
within eu, etc.
To conclude, the findings of this paper are, in general, in line with pre-
vious empirical research, as the empirical estimates confirm the detri-
mental eﬀect of tax wedge on employment growth. The added value of
the paper comparing to previous empirical studies stems out of the panel
regression analysis performed on five diﬀerent groups of workers and
thereby higher robustness of the results and the inclusion of the latest
available data for eu countries. However, one has to remember the lim-
itations of these findings deriving from the availability of good time se-
ries information on tax wedge, its composition, and other labour market
outcomes; small number of variables used and therefore possible forma-
tion of omitted variables problem; and insuﬃcient sources of variation
and low value of R2.
Notes
1 Although we mainly focus on the macroeconometric empirical literature
(due to the nature of our methodological approach), there are also several
empirical studies based on the micro data (see for example Gruber 1997;
Kugler and Kugler 2003; 2009).
2 Likewise, Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpeta (1998) argued that the collective
bargaining systems could influence the manner in which tax wedge af-
fects unemployment. Authors showed that the eﬀect of tax wedge is lower
in countries with highly decentralised and centralised bargaining arrange-
ments and stronger in countries with intermediate levels of co-ordination.
3 cee countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
4 According to nace Rev. 2, sectors c–k were replaced by sectors b–n.
5 TheMann-Whitney U non-parametric test was used due to small number
of studied countries.
6 The presence of heteroskedacity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional de-
pendence was confirmed by the likelihood-ratio test, Wooldrige test and
Pasaran cd test, respectively.
7 Although the data for 2010 are available, we present descriptive statis-
tics for 2009, as the data are accessible for all eu Member States, except
Cyprus.
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8 The low levels of tax wedge in Cyprus and Malta might be linked to their
historical ties to Britain, as also Ireland and United Kingdom show one of
the lowest tax wedges in the eu-15 (European Commission 2009a).
9 As the correlation coeﬃcients are statistically insignificant for most stud-
ied cases we do not present them in a separate table, however are available
at the authors.
10 Lower tax rate may increase companies’ business expectations which may
increase the companies’ willingness to employ (Stubelj 2010).
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